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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Moon appeals from the district court's order denying his Rule 35 request 
to have his conviction vacated based on an alleged lack of jurisdiction. 
Statement Of The Facts 
On October 18, 1995, the state charged Moon with statutory rape. (R., 
p.34.) "The Court released Moon on his own recognizance on October 23, 1995. 
Moon failed to appear for a hearing and the Court issued a bench warrant on 
December 14, 1995." (R., p.34.) Moon was arrested on the warrant on February 
20, 1996, and was again released, "this time on an ankle monitor and house 
arrest." (R., pp.34-35.) "Moon removed the ankle monitor and absconded" but 
was later arrested. (R., p.35.) 
On November 26, 1996, the state charged Moon with escape in violation 
of I.C. § 18-2505 based on Moon removing his ankle monitor and absconding 
from house arrest. (Prosecuting Attorney's Information (Augmentation). 1) The 
Information specifically alleged that Moon "on the 4th day of May, 1996, did then 
and there and while charged with a felony and under house arrest, outside the 
walls of the Bannock County Jail, did remove a home-monitor-device and 
1 The Court granted Moon's motion to augment the record with certain 
documents from his underlying criminal case. (Order Granting Motion to 
Augment the Record, dated May 31, 2013.) The Court entered a separate order 
augmenting the record in this case with the "Court File, Reporter's Transcript, 
and Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 29528," which appeal related to the 
denial of Moon's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., p.60.) 
1 
escape." (Prosecuting Attorney's Information, p.1 (Augmentation).) Moon pied 
guilty and the court imposed a unified five-year sentence with three years fixed to 
run consecutive to the sentence imposed in the rape case, but retained 
jurisdiction.2 (Minute Entry & Order filed December 30, 1996 (Augmentation); 
Minute Entry & Order filed February 13, 1997 (Augmentation); Commitment filed 
February 13, 1997 (Augmentation).) The court subsequently placed Moon on 
probation but later revoked probation and ordered Moon's sentences executed. 
Moon, 140 Idaho at 610, 97 P.3d at 477. "Moon did not appeal." kl 
On July 16, 2012, Moon filed a Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence 
"alleging that the court lacked statutory jurisdiction for which to charge him for an 
escape in 1996 .... "3 (See R., p.1.) In support of his Rule 35 motion, Moon filed 
a "Judicial Notice of Exhibit" in which he asserted: 
01. Defendant has brought a pleading before this court entitled 
Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence, whereby alleging that the 
court lacked statutory jurisdiction for which to charge him for an 
escape in 1996, when the statute was not written to include 
"intentional act of leaving the area of restriction set forth in a court 
order admitting a person to bail or release on a person's own 
recognizance with with [sic] electronic or global position system 
tracking, monitoring or detention or the area of restriction set forth 
in a sentencing order, except for leaving the area of restriction for 
the purpose of obtaining emergency medical care. A person may 
not be charged with the crime of escape for leaving the 
2 On the rape charge, the court imposed a 14-year sentence with seven years 
fixed and also retained jurisdiction. State v. Moon, 140 Idaho 609, 610, 97 P.3d 
476, 477 (Ct. App. 2004). 
3 Moon's actual Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence is not included in the 
record. According to the Idaho Repository, the motion was filed on July 16, 
2012. The first pleading in the record on appeal is the Judicial Notice of Exhibit, 
filed seven days later, on July 23, 2012. (R., p.1.) The basis for Moon's motion 
may be gleaned from his Judicial Notice of Exhibit. 
2 
aforementioned area of restriction unless the person was 
notified in writing by the court at the time of setting bail, 
release or sentencing of the conseguences of violating this 
section by intentionally leaving the area of restriction. House 
Bill No. 129 Title 18-2505 amendment 2007. 
02. Defendant submits that even if somehow this court could use 
this 2007 amendment in 1996 to charge him this court cannot 
provide any written notice to the Defendant, whereby stating that he 
would be charged for escape. 
(R., pp.1-2.) Attached to Moon's Judicial Notice of Exhibit were copies of 
documents related to the 2007 amendments to I.C. § 18-2505. (R., pp.4-18.) 
The district court denied Moon's motion, stating: 
This Court lacks jurisdiction over Moon's motion. Moon pied 
guilty to the crime of escape. That was a valid and existing crime in 
1996. He was sentenced on that crime based upon his guilty plea. 
Now, he attempts to attack his sentence, pursuant to Rule 35, by 
arguing that his conviction was not valid. Nothing in Rule 35 allows 
a Court to overturn a conviction. This is a matter that should have 
been addressed prior to Moon's plea of guilty. Alternatively, it 
should have been addressed on appeal of his conviction and 
sentence. 
In Hous[/ey] v. State, 119 Idaho 885, 811 P.2d 495 (Ct. App. 
1991 ), the Court of Appeals stated: 
Housely's [sic] premise for this particular [Rule 35] 
motion is that if his conviction is illegal his sentence must be 
illegal. Therefore, to "correct" his illegal sentence he must 
be permitted to attack his conviction along with his sentence. 
These allegations, attacking the validity of Housely's [sic] 
conviction, are beyond the scope of a Rule 35 motion. Other 
remedies, such as appeal or a petition for post-conviction 
relief, are available to set aside a wrongful conviction. The 
Rule 35 motion serves a narrower purpose. It subjects only 
the sentence to re-examination. 
A Rule 35 motion cannot be used to attack a conviction. 
Moon is attempting to do exactly what the appellate courts say 
cannot be done. He argues that his sentence is illegal because his 
conviction is illegal. This is an improper basis for a Rule 35 motion. 
3 
(R., p.36 (footnote and additional citations omitted).) 
Moon filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.38-41.) 
4 
ISSUES 
Moon states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court erroneously determined it was not 
authorized to consider Mr. Moon's claims when it was, in 
fact, required to do so, and so erroneously denied his Rule 
35 motion? 
2. Whether Mr. Moon's conviction for escape should be 
vacated because the district court did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction, since Mr. Moon's actions did not 
constitute a crime under the statute as it existed at that time? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as: 
Has Moon failed to establish that the district court erred in denying his 
Rule 35 request to vacate the judgment of conviction entered upon his guilty plea 
to escape because his request is beyond the proper scope of Rule 35? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
Moon Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Rule 35 Motion 
A Introduction 
Moon contends his escape conviction should be vacated, claiming "the 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is clear on the record because the actions 
alleged in this case to be criminal were not criminal under the plain language of 
the statute."4 (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) Application of the correct legal 
standards to the record shows Moon's jurisdictional argument fails and his Rule 
35 request to vacate his conviction using should be rejected as outside the scope 
of the narrow purpose of the rule. Alternatively, even if this Court considers the 
merits of Moon's argument, his request to vacate his conviction should be denied 
because his conduct constituted an escape within the meaning of I.C. § 18-
2505(1). 
4 Moon also argues the district court erred when it determined it was "not 
authorized" to consider his Rule 35 motion and asks that the "decision be 
reversed and the case remanded, at least for a determination of the merits of Mr. 
Moon's claims, if not for an order vacating the conviction entered without subject 
matter jurisdiction." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Although the district court stated it 
did not have "jurisdiction" over Moon's motion, it is clear from the court's decision 
that its rationale for denying the motion was Moon's request to vacate his 
conviction was not the proper subject of a Rule 35 motion. (R., p.36.) Whether 
that conclusion was correct is the core of the second issue raised by Moon and 
will be the focus of the state's response. That issue is a question of law, subject 
to free review, and remand for determination of that issue is neither necessary 
nor appropriate in this case. Further, it is well-established that this Court may 
affirm on a correct theory supported by the record. State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 
837,841,291 P.3d 1036, 1040 (2013) (citations omitted). 
6 
B. Standard Of Review 
"As a general matter, it is a question of law as to whether a sentence is 
illegal or was imposed in an illegal fashion, and this Court exercises free review 
over questions of law." State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 839, 252 P.3d 1255, 1257 
(2011) (citing State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009)). 
"Jurisdiction is likewise a question of law and is reviewed de nova." Lute, 150 
Idaho at 839, 252 P.3d at 1257 (citing State v. Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 381, 957 
P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998)). 
C. The Trial Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Moon And This Court 
Should Conclude Moon's Request To Vacate His Conviction Is Beyond 
The Scope Of Rule 35 
Moon's illegal sentence claim is based entirely on his assertion that his 
conviction is illegal. Specifically, Moon, relying on interpretations of and 
amendments to I.C. § 18-2505 after his conviction became final, argues there 
was no subject matter jurisdiction in his escape case. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-
15.) Moon's jurisdictional argument is without merit and his attempt to use Rule 
35 to vacate his conviction should be rejected. 
Jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even where a defendant, like Moon, 
has pied guilty. State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883,889, 11 P.3d 1101, 1107 (2000). 
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general type 
or class of dispute." Lute, 150 Idaho at 840, 252 P.3d at 1258 (quoting Bach v. 
Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305, 308 (2007)). "The information, 
indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was committed within the State of 
7 
Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the court." Lute, 150 Idaho at 840, 
252 P.3d at 1258 (quoting State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 
1132 (2004)). 
The Information charging Moon with escape alleged "an offense was 
committed within the State of Idaho." This was sufficient to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction on the district court. Moon claims otherwise, relying on State v. Olin, 
153 Idaho 891, 292 P.3d 282 (Ct. App. 2012), and State v. Izzard, 136 Idaho 
124, 29 P.3d 960 (Ct. App. 2001). (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) In Izzard, the Court 
of Appeals held: 
A jurisdictional defect exists: (1) when the alleged facts are not 
made criminal by statute; (2) there is a failure to state facts 
essential to establish the offense charged; (3) the alleged facts 
show on their face that the court has no jurisdiction of the charged 
offense; or (4) the allegations fail to show that the offense charged 
was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. 
136 Idaho at 127, 29 P.3d at 963 (citing Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736, 739, 747 
P.2d 758, 761 (Ct. App. 1987)). 
Subsequently, in Olin, the Court of Appeals recited the four types of 
jurisdictional defects set forth in Izzard but noted "the Idaho Supreme Court ha[d] 
modified the jurisdictional analysis by differentiating between due process issues 
and those involving jurisdiction" and recognized that reference to the applicable 
code section in a charging document is generally sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 
Olin, 153 Idaho at 893-894, 292 P.3d at 284-285 (citing State v. Jones, 140 
Idaho 755, 760, 101 P.3d 699, 704 (2004); State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 
621-622, 115 P.3d 710, 712-713 (2005)). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals 
8 
adhered to the principle that "a jurisdictional defect is present when the facts 
alleged do not constitute a prosecutable act under the laws of the State," 
concluding, "the distinction in more recent cases between due process and 
jurisdictional challenges has not altered this outcome." Olin, 153 Idaho at 894, 
292 P .3d at 285. Applying this principle to the facts before it, the Court in Olin 
held the district court lacked jurisdiction over one of the counts to which Olin pied 
guilty because although the crime existed at the time Olin entered his plea 
(masturbating in the presence of a child in violation of I.C. § 18-1506(1)(d)), it did 
not exist at the time of the offense. 153 Idaho at 894-895, 292 P.3d at 285-286. 
The Court's opinion in Olin does not save Moon's jurisdictional claim. 
Unlike in Olin, the crime to which Moon pied guilty - escape - did exist at the time 
of the alleged offense. Moon's entire argument that his acts did not constitute a 
crime are based on interpretations of and amendments to I.C. § 18-2505 years 
after he pied guilty. However, as explained in Olin, "That the statute was 
amended after [Moon] committed the acts is of no consequence because in [a] 
jurisdictional analysis [the Court] look[s] to the dates alleged and [will] apply the 
law as it appeared [at that time]." 153 Idaho at 895, 292 P.3d at 286. In 1996, 
when Moon committed and was charged with escape, the statute read, in 
relevant part: 
Every prisoner charged with, convicted of, or on probation for a 
felony who is confined in any jail or prison including the state 
penitentiary, or who while outside the walls of such jail or prison in 
the proper custody of any officer or person, or while in any factory, 
farm or other place without the walls of such jail or prison, who 
escapes or attempts to escape from such officer or person, or from 
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such jail or prison, or from such factory, farm or other place without 
the walls of such jail or prison, shall be guilty of a felony .... 
I.C. § 18-2505(1) (emphasis added). 
Moon's act of removing his ankle bracelet and absconding from house 
arrest for his pending felony rape case constituted an escape under the plain 
language of the statute, and the district court had jurisdiction to convict him upon 
his guilty plea to that offense. Moon never claimed otherwise prior to pleading 
guilty to that charge or on direct appeal. 
Contrary to Moon's claim, the Court of Appeals' interpretation of I.C. § 18-
2505 seven years later in State v. Shanks, 139 Idaho 152, 75 P .3d 206 (Ct. App. 
2003), is irrelevant to the jurisdictional inquiry in this case as is the 2007 
amendment to the statute. Olin, 153 Idaho at 895, 292 P.3d at 286. Moreover, 
Moon's use of Rule 35 to pursue relief from his conviction based on an after-the-
fact analysis of the statute as applied to his conduct should not be permitted. 
"Idaho Criminal Rule 35 is a narrow rule that allows a trial court to correct 
an illegal sentence at any time, or to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner within 120 days." Clements, 148 Idaho at 84,218 P.3d at 1145 (citations 
omitted). In Clements, the Court held that "the term 'illegal sentence' under Rule 
35 is narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record, 
i.e., does not involve significant questions of fact or require an evidentiary 
hearing." kl at 86, 218 P.3d at 1147. Rule 35 "is not a vehicle designed to 
reexamine the facts underlying the case to determine whether a sentence is 
illegal." kl (citation omitted). "[R]ather, the rule only applies to a narrow 
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category of cases in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not 
authorized by law or where new evidence tends to show that the original 
sentence was excessive." kl Applying this standard, the Court in Clements 
concluded the district court exceeded the scope of its authority by conducting an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the two weapons enhancements to 
which Clements pied guilty arose out of the same indivisible course of conduct. 
kl at 87-88, 218 P.3d at 1148-1149. 
After Clements, the Supreme Court considered a jurisdictional argument 
raised in a Rule 35 motion. In Lute, the defendant filed a Rule 35 motion 
asserting "the grand jury that indicted him was acting without authority as its 
commission had expired and, therefore, the district court had no subject matter 
jurisdiction over his case and could not properly enter a Judgment of conviction." 
150 Idaho at 838, 252 P.3d at 1256. Lute also argued "the conviction underlying 
his sentence is for something that is not a crime in Idaho and, as such, any 
sentence given for such conduct is necessarily illegal." kl The state responded, 
in part, that Lute's claim was moot because Lute did not file his Rule 35 motion 
until after he completed serving his sentence; accordingly, any correction to his 
sentence would be meaningless. kl at 839, 252 P.3d at 1258. In rejecting this 
argument, the Court stated: 
[W]here there is a jurisdictional defect, this court has authority to 
address that issue, even if it is not raised by the parties themselves. 
Furthermore, where it is apparent from the record that the act the 
defendant was criminally convicted for is not a crime according to 
the laws of the state, this Court has the authority to vacate the 
convictions sua sponte. 
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Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial 
court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once 
the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time for 
appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal. However, where a 
court properly has jurisdiction to consider a case-as it does here 
to consider Lute's I.C.R. 35 motion-and it is apparent that there is 
an issue concerning subject matter jurisdiction or that a defendant 
was convicted for something that is not a crime, this Court must 
correct that error. 
Lute, 150 Idaho at 840, 252 P.3d at 1258 (citations, quotations, and brackets 
from opinion omitted). 
In Lute, the Court endorsed the use of Rule 35 to address the defendant's 
claim that his conviction was invalid because the grand jury had expired when it 
returned its indictment against him and, therefore, "the district court never 
properly had jurisdiction over the case." 150 Idaho at 841, 252 P.3d at 1259. 
"Having reversed on this issue," the Court declined to consider Lute's other 
argument - that "the crime he pied guilty to was not proscribed in the Idaho 
Code." 1st at 839, 841, 252 P.3d at 1257, 1259. As such, the Court did not 
discuss the parameters of using Rule 35 to vacate a conviction on that basis. 
Use of Rule 35 for this purpose should be strictly circumscribed consistent with 
Clements and narrowly applied to situations such as those present in Clements, 
Lute, and Olin. 
Moon's sentence is not illegal as defined in Clements nor is it apparent 
from the face of the record that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. What 
Moon is asking this Court to do is to re-examine the facts of his case, interpret 
I.C. § 18-2505, and decide whether his actions constituted an escape. That is an 
unprecedented use of Rule 35, and an improper one given the "narrow" 
12 
application of the rule. Clements, supra. The Court's opinion in State v. 
McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 291 P.3d 1036 (2013), does not support any assertion 
otherwise. 
The question presented in McKinney was whether "a double jeopardy 
claim may properly be brought in a Rule 35 motion." 153 Idaho at 841, 291 P.3d 
at 1040. The Court, citing Clements, held that it could "because any double 
jeopardy violation would be apparent from the face of the record" since "[u]nder 
the federal strict element theory, whether one crime is a lesser included offense 
of another crime can be determined merely be examining the respective statutes 
defining those crimes" and "under Idaho's pleading theory, whether one crime is 
a lesser included offense of another crime can be determined ... simply by 
reading the information charging each crime." kl at 840-841, 291 P.3d at 1039-
1040. Moon's Rule 35 motion is not conducive to such a simple facial analysis. 
Rather, Moon's request requires the Court to engage in an interpretation of I.C. § 
18-2505 to determine whether it encompasses the conduct to which Moon 
already pied guilty. This is a quintessential type of request that a defendant 
should be required to make prior to entry of judgment, not as part of a Rule 35 
motion years after his conviction is final. 
Even if this Court is willing to consider the merits of Moon's Rule 35 
motion, his reliance on the Court of Appeals' interpretation of I. C. § 18-2505 in 
Shanks, 139 Idaho 152, 75 P.3d 206, does not support his claim that his 
conviction is illegal. In Shanks, the defendant was arrested on two outstanding 
warrants. 139 Idaho at 153, 75 P.3d at 207. After deputies arrested Shanks, 
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they placed him in the back of a patrol vehicle, but forgot to lock it, and 
momentarily lost sight of him when they entered the residence at which he was 
arrested. kl at 153, 75 P.3d at 207. A few minutes later, "one of the deputies 
returned to the vehicle and found that the rear window on the driver's side was 
down and that Shanks was gone." kl An immediate search for Shanks was 
unsuccessful, but the deputies located him several hours later and the state 
charged him with escape in violation of I.C. § 18-2505 . .[Q_,_ 
Shanks filed a motion to dismiss, claiming I.C. § 18-2505 was 
"inapplicable to him because, at the time he exited the patrol vehicle, he was not 
a 'prisoner' as the term is used in I.C. § 18-2505, and he had not been confined 
in any correctional facility, as required for violation of that statute." kl On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals addressed both issues. kl at 154-156, 75 P.3d at 
208-210. In doing so, the Court identified the following four elements in I.C. § 18-
2505(1): 
Commission of the offense requires that the defendant: (1) was a 
"prisoner," (2) charged with, convicted of, or on probation for, a 
felony; (3) confined in a correctional facility, outside the walls of 
such correctional facility in the proper custody of any officer or 
person, or in a factory, farm, or other place without the walls of 
such correctional facility; and (4) escaped or attempted to escape 
from such officer or person, from such correctional facility, or such 
factory, farm, or other place. 
Shanks, 139 Idaho at 155, 75 P.3d at 209. 
Addressing Shanks' first argument, the Court held that Shanks was a 
prisoner within the meaning of the statute. Shanks, 139 Idaho at 155, 75 P .3d at 
209. With respect to Shanks' second argument, the Court analyzed "whether 
14 
Shanks was 'outside the walls of such correctional facility."' kl The Court 
framed the question as "whether § 18-2505(1) refers to all persons in custody 
outside the confines of a correctional facility or only those who have been, at 
some point, incarcerated within a correctional facility." kl The Court ultimately 
held, based on the "linguistic structure" of I.C. § 18-2505(1), "that an individual 
must at some point have been confined in a correctional facility before he may be 
considered to be outside the walls of 'such' correctional facility." kl at 156, 75 
P.3d at 210. The Court found this interpretation was "consistent" with the rule of 
lenity and the "purpose of I.C. § 18-2505, which is to 'preserve the integrity of 
Idaho's jails and penal institutions, to deter escape by those who are lawfully 
confined in Idaho correctional facilities and to prevent harm to the public that may 
be effected by such persons while at large."' kl (quoting State v. Swisher, 125 
Idaho 797,799,874 P.2d 608,610 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
Applying the foregoing interpretation to the facts in Shanks, the Court 
"conclude[d] that Shanks was not 'outside the walls of such correctional facility,' 
because he had not yet been placed in a correctional facility when he emerged 
from the patrol car and fled. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed the 
charge." Shanks, 139 Idaho at 156, 75 P.3d at 210. Even accepting the 
proposition that Moon could use Rule 35 to benefit from this interpretation of I.C. 
§ 18-2505 made nearly seven years after he pied guilty, the interpretation does 
not benefit him. 
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Unlike in Shanks, Moon had been placed in jail5 prior to being released on 
house arrest with an ankle monitor. (See R., p.35.) He was charged with escape 
after he removed his ankle monitor and absconded. (See id.; Prosecuting 
Attorney's Information (Augmentation).) Accordingly, Moon's conduct satisfied 
the third element of I.C. § 18-2505 identified by the Court in Shanks. Moon 
argues otherwise, claiming a "person would have to be in the direct custody and 
control of the Department of Correction, though not necessarily in prison, in order 
to effect an escape, and still give meaning to each of the three specified 
locations." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) According to Moon, "[t]he situation 
described by 'outside the walls in the custody of an officer or person,' when 
considered in light of the Shanks decision, is more akin to a work release 
scenario or to transport to and from the courthouse or between penal facilities." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Moon is incorrect and his argument is unsupported by 
Shanks, which merely stands for the proposition "that an individual must at some 
point have been confined in a correctional facility before he may be considered to 
be outside the walls of 'such' correctional facility." kl at 156, 75 P.3d at 210. 
Further, Moon fails to explain why "work release," which he claims would be 
covered, should be viewed any differently than "house arrest" for purposes of I.C. 
§ 18-2505's inclusion of "place[s] without the walls of such jail or prison." 
Moon's reliance on the 2007 amendments to I.C. § 18-2505, even if 
considered contrary to Olin's statement that the relevant inquiry is limited to the 
5 When Moon pied guilty, I. C. § 18-2505( 1) used the term "jail or prison" rather 
than "correctional facility." 
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law as it existed at the time he was convicted, also does not support his claim. 
As Moon notes, in 2007, the legislature amended I.C. § 18-2505(1) to add the 
following two sentences: 
Escape includes the intentional act of leaving the area of 
restriction set forth in a court order admitting a person to bail or 
release on a person's own recognizance with electronic or global 
positioning system tracking, monitoring and detention or the area of 
restriction for the purpose of obtaining emergency medical care. A 
person may not be charged with the crime of escape for leaving the 
aforementioned area of restriction unless the person was notified in 
writing by the court at the time of setting of bail, release or 
sentencing of the consequences of violating this section by 
intentionally leaving the area of restriction. 
2007 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 114, § 1, p.329.6 
The 2007 amendments did not change the elements of the offense but, 
by Moon's own admission, simply made clear that his conduct was encompassed 
within what qualifies as an escape. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.) If anything, 
those amendments undermine Moon's argument that he pied guilty to a non-
existent offense. As explained in State v. Reed, 154 Idaho 20, _, 294 P.3d 
1132, 1135 (Ct. App. 2012), "a change to the application or substantive meaning 
of a statute is not the only reason for legislative amendment; the legislature also 
makes amendments to clarify or strengthen the existing provisions of a statute." 
(Citations omitted.) "Here, it is apparent that a legislative clarification is what was 
intended by the [2007] amendment. It clarifies the statute so that there can be no 
mistake that," id., a defendant commits an escape if he intentionally leaves the 
"area of restriction set forth in a court order admitting a person to bail or release 
6 The statute was amended again in 2010 to remove the words "and detention" in 
the third sentence. 2010 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 28, § 1, p.47. 
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on a person's own recognizance with electronic or global positioning system 
tracking," I.C. § 18-2505(1). 
Finally, Moon analogizes his case to State v. Rocque, 104 Idaho 445, 660 
P.2d 57 (1983). (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) In Rocque, the defendant was 
convicted of burglary and placed on probation. 104 Idaho at 445, 660 P.2d at 57. 
Rocque's probation agreement required him to spend his nights in the Ada 
County jail but he was allowed to leave to work during the day as part of the 
"work release" program. lit "Rocque left the jail one morning ostensibly to go to 
work. He did not return to the jail that evening, but rather later left Ada County 
and the State of Idaho for Spokane, Washington." lit at 446, 660 P.2d at 58. As 
a result, Rocque was charged with and convicted of escape. lit On appeal, the 
Court, "under the unusual circumstances presented[.] ... deem[ed] the evidence 
insufficient to support that conviction . . .. " lit The Court reasoned that the 
requirement that Rocque spend his evenings in jail "was the result of a voluntary 
probation agreement" and, as such, "his failure to return to the jail was not an 
'escape' from custody since he had not been sentenced." lit 
Aside from the significant procedural distinction that Rocque's claim was 
before the Court on direct appeal as a sufficiency of the evidence argument, as 
opposed to a Rule 35 motion, which certainly does not encompass those types of 
claims, the facts are not even remotely similar. Moon was not on house arrest as 
a "voluntarily" condition of probation. He was confined to his home under 
electronic supervision in lieu of incarceration pending his rape trial. Moon's claim 
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that his case is "more akin to that in Rocque" rather than a plain violation of the 
escape statute, to which he pied guilty, is without merit. (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) 
The district court had jurisdiction to accept Moon's guilty plea to escape 
and to enter judgment thereon. Moon's attempt to vacate that valid conviction 
based on subsequent interpretations of and amendments to I.C. § 18-2505 that 
do not even support his claim, is not within the purview of Rule 35 and otherwise 
fails on the merits. Moon has failed to establish otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Moon's Rule 35 motion. 
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